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Entrepreneurial experiences from venture capital funding: 
exploring two-sided information asymmetry
Sarah Glücksman
Department of Technology Management and Economics, Division of Entrepreneurship & Strategy, Chalmers 
University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden
ABSTRACT
Information between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (VCs) is 
often shared unequally. VCs are experienced and professional deal-
makers, while entrepreneurs have great knowledge about their 
venture but usually limited knowledge about VCs’ financing pro-
cess and requirements. For entrepreneurs, VCs’ asymmetric infor-
mation advantage can lead to difficulties in receiving funding, 
unfavorable terms, or negative startup experiences. Based on in- 
depth interviews with 20 Swedish entrepreneurs, this study inves-
tigates entrepreneurial experiences of mitigating the problems 
arising from information asymmetry in a VC–entrepreneur relation-
ship. Four themes emerged from these interviews: (1) choosing the 
optimal time to raise the initial external capital, (2) ensuring that the 
VC fits the startup, (3) studying and understanding the venture 
capital process beforehand, and (4) building an open and honest 
relationship with the VC. Although entrepreneurs have not devel-
oped any formal tools similar to what VCs employ to mitigate 
information asymmetry risks, our study shows that entrepreneurs 
use informal tools based on their own and others’ experiences. This 
indicates that the entrepreneur might play a more active role in the 
VC–entrepreneur relationship than most previous studies have 
assumed.
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1. Introduction
Fundraising doesn’t always mean success. Congratulating an entrepreneur on raising money 
is like congratulating a chef on buying vegetables. 
Ankur Singla, founder of Akosha.com
Venture capitalists (VCs) invest equity capital in entrepreneurial ventures, where they 
search for ventures with a potential for rapid growth that can achieve significant size and 
market position (Gompers and Lerner 2004). A major problem in the VC–entrepreneur 
financing situation is the presence of information asymmetries between entrepreneurs 
and capital providers (Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998; Landström 2017). Information is 
often shared unequally among the parties and available market information about new 
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ventures is usually very limited. Some of the issues that arise from information asymme-
tries are agency problems, which generally arise in the form of adverse selection and 
moral hazard (Amit et al. 1998). Numerous researchers have studied the mechanisms that 
VCs have developed to mitigate their agency problems, such as screening, contracting, 
monitoring, and staging of investments (e.g., Arcot 2014; Burchardt et al. 2016; Cumming 
2006; Fried and Hisrich 1994; Gompers and Lerner 2004).
However, the information asymmetry in the VC–entrepreneur relationship is two-sided 
in the sense that new entrepreneurs usually have limited knowledge about the VC’s 
decision process and investment cycle (Dessein 2005; Landström 2017). VCs are experi-
enced and professional dealmakers, while entrepreneurs have great knowledge about 
their venture but usually limited knowledge about VCs’ financing process and require-
ments. This can lead to disadvantages for the entrepreneurs in terms of difficulties in 
receiving funding, receiving unfavorable terms, or having negative startup experiences. 
As the process is recurrent for VCs but infrequent for entrepreneurs, it is difficult for 
entrepreneurs to develop common practices or tools to manage VCs’ asymmetric infor-
mation advantage. Instead, new founders need to rely on the experience and knowledge 
of other entrepreneurs with prior venture capital experience.
Although scholars have acknowledged that problems arising from asymmetric infor-
mation are two-sided (Carpentier and Suret 2006; Christensen, Wuebker, and 
Wüstenhagen 2009; De Bettignies and Brander 2007; Drover, Wood, and Fassin 2014; 
Fairchild 2011; Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001), research has not managed to empirically 
identify how these problems are managed by the entrepreneurs. There are certain studies 
that take the entrepreneur’s perspective on the VC–entrepreneur relationship; however, 
these are largely restricted to criteria entrepreneurs utilize in their evaluations of potential 
VCs (Bengtsson and Wang 2010; Drover, Wood, and Fassin 2014; Fairchild 2011; Hallen 
and Eisenhardt 2012; Hsu 2004; Valliere and Peterson 2007). What is missing, however, is 
research that considers how entrepreneurs manage VCs’ asymmetric information advan-
tage throughout the full venture capital cycle, from the initial selection phase, through 
the investment process to the exit.
This study aims to address this research gap by studying how entrepreneurs mitigate 
problems from information asymmetry in a VC–entrepreneur relationship. The term 
venture capitalist (VC) refers, in this paper, to an investor that acts as an intermediary 
between financial institutions and unquoted ventures (Gompers and Lerner 2001). Based 
on in-depth interviews with 20 Swedish entrepreneurs, this study investigates experi-
ences gained by founders from mitigating information asymmetry problems for a VC- 
backed startup. Four mechanisms emerged from this process: (1) choosing the optimal 
time to raise the initial external capital (timing), (2) ensuring that a VC fits the startup 
(matching), (3) studying and understanding the venture capital process beforehand 
(preparing), and (4) building an open and trusting relationship with the VC (trust- 
building).
This study provides three contributions. First, it underlines how a two-sided agency 
perspective on a VC–entrepreneur relationship helps identifying mechanisms that miti-
gate information asymmetry problems for the entrepreneurs. Findings from this study 
challenge the traditional agency theory approach in a VC–entrepreneur relationship 
where it is generally assumed that VCs act as principals and entrepreneurs act as agents 
(cf. Arthurs and Busenitz 2003; Drover, Wood, and Fassin 2014). Second, it extends the 
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existing literature on two-sided information asymmetry in a VC–entrepreneur financing 
situation (Carpentier and Suret 2006; Christensen, Wuebker, and Wüstenhagen 2009; De 
Bettignies and Brander 2007; Drover, Wood, and Fassin 2014; Fairchild 2011; Shepherd 
and Zacharakis 2001) by discussing the mechanisms that entrepreneurs use to mitigate 
the VCs’ asymmetric information advantage. In so doing, this study answers calls for 
research on what entrepreneurs can do to create a good partnership with VCs (Zacharakis, 
Erikson, and George 2010) and how information asymmetries could be used to study 
double-sided agency problems in a VC–entrepreneur relationship (Fairchild 2011). Third, 
this study makes important practical contribution to entrepreneurs and practitioners 
aiming to support nascent entrepreneurs by gathering valuable advice on issues con-
cerning venture capital funding.
2. Information asymmetry in the VC–entrepreneur relationship
2.1. Information asymmetry and agency problems
Information asymmetry is a condition in which one party in a relationship has more or 
better information than the other party (Akerlof 1970). In a VC–entrepreneurial financing 
situation, information is often shared unequally among the parties and the problem of 
information asymmetry is generally cited as the main explanation of the financial con-
straints faced by small firms (Landström 2017; MacIntosh 1994; Sahlman 1990; Wilson, 
Wright, and Kacer 2018). Among the issues that arise from information asymmetries are 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976). These problems arise because of “hidden 
information” and “hidden actions” between the parties (Amit et al. 1998). Hidden infor-
mation refers to a situation in which one party possesses relevant information that is not 
known by the other party, for example, entrepreneurs have more information about their 
driving forces and their venture than investors. A situation with high information asym-
metry in the form of hidden information creates the risk of “adverse selection” where the 
VC will have difficulties distinguishing between good and bad ventures to invest in. 
Hidden actions tend to give rise to “moral hazard,” which occurs when one party cannot 
observe relevant actions taken by the other party, for example, once the entrepreneurs 
have raised capital, they might spend it on items that are not in accordance with the VC’s 
interest.
However, the problem of information asymmetry is two-sided in the sense that nascent 
entrepreneurs are unfamiliar with VCs’ financing process and requirements and that VCs 
sometimes withhold certain information from the entrepreneurs (Carpentier and Suret 
2006; Landström 2017). Difficulties in distinguishing between good and bad VCs due to 
lack of experience and knowledge is an adverse selection problem for the entrepreneur. 
The choice between different funding alternatives (e.g., bank lending, business angels, VC, 
bootstrapping) can also result in an adverse selection problem for the entrepreneur due 
to a lack of knowledge and experience about the advantages and disadvantages of 
different types of startup funding.
Furthermore, a VC often provides substantial managerial contributions to the venture 
(Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Gompers and Lerner 2004; Hellmann and Puri 2000). 
However, these “efforts” provided by the VC are not something that can be verified 
beforehand, creating a potential moral hazard problem for the entrepreneur in which 
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the VC might expend insufficient effort (De Bettignies and Brander 2007). The fact that 
a VC often has a portfolio of firms means that an investor’s risk profile differs greatly from 
an entrepreneur’s; because the VC’s investments are more diversified (Manigart, Baeyens, 
and Van Hyfte 2002), the investor might push the entrepreneur toward excessive risk- 
taking. In addition, VCs need to allocate their limited resources between all their portfolio 
firms. Hence, actual allocation of resources might differ greatly from those which an 
entrepreneur’s requirements and expectations (Gifford 1997). There is also a time limit 
to the relationship. VCs need to realize their investments after a certain number of years to 
show returns to their investors, which might push the VC to exit early. The intended and 
actual post-investment behavior of the VC could, therefore, be perceived as entailing both 
hidden information and actions hidden from the entrepreneur.
Several researchers have started to argue that the agency perspective in entrepreneur-
ial finance literature describes the VC–entrepreneur relationship in a one-sided direction. 
These scholars argue that most research on moral hazard is focused on the VC’s control 
over the entrepreneur’s opportunistic behavior while ignoring the entrepreneur’s concern 
that the VC may act opportunistically (Christensen, Wuebker, and Wüstenhagen 2009; 
Drover, Wood, and Fassin 2014; Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001). Hence, prior works 
conclude that adverse selection and moral hazard problems are present from the VC’s 
perspective as well as from the entrepreneur’s perspective.
2.2. Mitigating information asymmetry risks
The ability to manage information asymmetry risks tends to distinguish good capital 
providers from the bad ones (Amit et al. 1998). Numerous researchers have studied the 
mechanisms that VCs have developed to mitigate their agency problems (Drover et al. 
2017). To overcome adverse selection problems, investors use mechanisms such as 
screening, due diligence, syndication of deals, and specialization (e.g., Cumming 2006; 
Fried and Hisrich 1994; Gompers and Lerner 2004). To overcome moral hazard issues, VCs 
use mechanisms such as staging of investments, legal contracting, and extensive mon-
itoring (e.g., Arcot 2014; Burchardt et al. 2016; Pruthi, Wright, and Lockett 2003). 
Entrepreneurs use mechanisms as “signaling” to reduce uncertainty and information 
asymmetries which concern VCs. In order to convince capital providers about the qualities 
of the venture, entrepreneurs need to send positive signals about themselves and about 
their venture. Examples of such signals are the establishment of a limited company, 
relating the venture to individuals and businesses with higher status or educational 
experience of the management team (Connelly et al. 2011; Bollazzi, Risalvato, and 
Venezia 2019). The term “investment readiness” is used together with signaling to explain 
whether founders are perceived to possess the attributes, which makes them an investible 
proposition by an investor (Gregory et al. 2012; Silver, Berggren, and Veghohn 2010).
However, all the mechanisms above are used to reduce the information asymmetry 
risks from the VC’s perspective. The goal of these mechanisms is to make it easier for VC’s to 
distinguish between good and bad ventures (adverse selection) or to decrease the risk of 
opportunistic behavior from the entrepreneur (moral hazard). To the best of our knowl-
edge, no study has so far examined how entrepreneurs mitigate their information asym-
metry problems. How do entrepreneurs distinguish between different funding 
alternatives and investors (adverse selection) or how do entrepreneurs handle their 
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concern that the VC may act opportunistically (moral hazard)? Therefore, the purpose of 
this study is to investigate how entrepreneurs mitigate information asymmetry risks in 
a VC–entrepreneur relationship.
2.3. Entrepreneurial perspective on the VC process
Although there is a vast literature about how VCs screen and select the entrepreneurial 
firms they wish to invest in (e.g., Fried and Hisrich 1994; Hsu et al. 2014; Sahlman 1990), 
only a handful of studies have looked at VC investments from an entrepreneur’s perspec-
tive (De Bettignies and Brander 2007: De Clercq et al. 2006; Drover, Wood, and Fassin 
2014; Fairchild 2011; Hallen and Eisenhardt 2012; Hsu 2004; Valliere and Peterson 2007; 
Zacharakis, Erikson, and George 2010).
De Bettignies and Brander (2007) examined the entrepreneur’s choice between bank 
finance and venture capital and found that there is a two-sided moral hazard problem 
when choosing venture capital as both the entrepreneur and VC provide unverifiable 
effort. Fairchild (2011) analyzed the entrepreneur’s choice between VC and angel finan-
cing and found that an entrepreneur may consider both economic and behavioral factors 
when making choice of financier. De Clercq et al. (2006) discussed how entrepreneurs 
should find the right investors, secure the right amount of money, and obtain a deal 
structured in an equitable manner. The study also suggested that foundations for a good 
match between VC and entrepreneur relate to complementary skills and the potential for 
the entrepreneur and VC to have an open, trusting relationship. Although these studies 
acknowledge the active part of the entrepreneur in the VC–entrepreneur relationship, 
they have no empirical findings from entrepreneurs but base their findings indirectly on 
research of VCs.
Studies with empirical findings from entrepreneurs largely focus on the evaluation of 
potential VCs. Valliere and Peterson (2007) found that both novice and experienced 
entrepreneurs considered valuation to be the primary criterion, and also viewed the 
terms and conditions of the investment deal as important. Furthermore, the study 
suggested that entrepreneurs were not particularly looking for “smart money,” that is, 
investors capable of providing a range of additional services to help the portfolio firm. Hsu 
(2004) suggested that entrepreneurs are willing to forego offers with higher valuations to 
partner with more reputable VCs. Hallen and Eisenhardt (2012) found that firms that form 
investment ties efficiently avoid drawn-out and high-effort searches, failed attempts, and 
undesirable partners. Drover, Wood, and Fassin (2014) found that ethical reputation of 
a VC profoundly influences the entrepreneur’s willingness to partner. Zacharakis, Erikson, 
and George (2010) suggested that it is important for the entrepreneurial team to build 
cohesion both within the team and with the VC to avoid lower overall performance if 
conflicts arise. These studies are insightful because they suggest that the entrepreneur 
plays an active part in the relationship and that there are interesting insights from 
entrepreneurs with prior venture capital experience.
3. Methods
To investigate experiences from mitigating information asymmetry risks in a VC–entre-
preneur relationship, interviews with 20 entrepreneurs who had founded one or more 
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venture capital backed startups were conducted. To obtain interviewees, purposeful 
sampling was used in this study to select entrepreneurs who had experience with our 
research phenomenon but had various backgrounds and whose ventures were in differ-
ent industries and stages. In this sampling procedure, the selection criterion is based on 
a specific variable of interest, often for comparison purposes (Eisenhardt 1989). The 
founders were found through Internet searches, personal networks, and snowball sam-
pling of participant entrepreneurs. We included entrepreneurs who were currently funded 
by venture capital, as well as entrepreneurs who had received funding five to ten years 
ago and either they and/or the VCs had left the company. This was done to limit the 
influence of biases in our study, as interviews with entrepreneurs who raised funding 
some time ago could potentially contain retrospective bias and entrepreneurs with 
current venture capital financing could be considered hypothetical in nature. Thus, our 
approach balances both prospective and retrospective experiences. Most of the founders 
had experience of at least one failed attempt at raising venture capital.
Table 1 lists the descriptive information for all interviewed entrepreneurs and their 
companies. The startups were founded between 1997 and 2015. Two companies had 
been liquidated by founders, three companies had been acquired, and four companies 
had made IPOs. The remaining companies were still run as privately held firms. The 
number of employees based on the last available annual report varied from 3 to 71, 
with a median number of 13 employees. The entrepreneurs were either still working in the 
venture capital funded startup, had started a new company or had become an angel 
investor (individuals who invest their own capital in new startups). If the founder was no 
longer with the company, this was noted as an “entrepreneurial exit” in Table 1. An 
entrepreneurial exit refers to founders of privately held firms who leave the firm they 
started and thereby reduce or loose ownership and decision-making power in the firm 
(DeTienne 2010). Certain entrepreneurs had founded several ventures and were noted as 
Table 1. Table of interview participants.
Primary industry
Company 
founded
Entrepreneurial 
exit Position today Age
Serial 
entrepreneur
Media Tech 2008 No CEO 33 No
Business Intelligence 2009 No CEO 40 Yes
Health Tech 2014 No CEO 34 No
Software/Services 2011 Yes CEO new company 37 Yes
Sales and marketing 
platform
2012 Yes Angel investor 39 Yes
Consumer products 2004 Yes CEO new company 55 Yes
P2P distribution network 2015 Yes Employed 31 No
Renewable energy 2007 Yes Consultant 39 Yes
Energy monitoring 2008 No Business Developer 37 No
Medical equipment 2004 Yes CEO new company 38 Yes
Video analytics software 2006 Yes CEO new company 39 No
Medical equipment 2005 No Board member 60 No
Recruitment 1997 Yes Founder new 
company
51 Yes
Computer graphics 2002 Yes Consultant 45 Yes
Online gaming 2004 Yes Investor 39 Yes
Green Tech 2010 No CEO 34 No
HR Tech 2014 No CEO 39 No
Gamification 2012 No CEO 37 No
IoT 2013 No Business Developer 30 No
Tech components 2014 No CEO 59 No
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“serial entrepreneurs” in Table 1. For these entrepreneurs, the interview was based on the 
experiences from the first startup for which they had received venture capital. The 
questions regarding the subsequent ventures focused on what they did differently 
compared with the first venture. Although this study focused on institutional VCs, that 
is, limited partnerships where the partners invest in the VC fund, most ventures were 
financed with external capital from both institutional venture capital and business angels. 
Two out of the 20 interviewed entrepreneurs were women.
To gain additional perspective and triangulate the data from the entrepreneurs, two 
additional interviews were carried out with VCs who previously had founded their own 
venture capital-backed startups. The interviews with these investors mainly focused on 
how they use their entrepreneurial experiences in discussions with new ventures 
today. In total, 22 interviews were conducted. Additionally, current and archival sec-
ondary data for each founder regarding their venture capital funding were collected, 
including website materials, annual reports, and newspaper clippings. These docu-
ments added details to the background story and allowed comparisons with the 
interview data.
A semi-structured format was used for the interviews, starting with a standard list of 
questions (Appendix A). We talked about their financing journey and for each phase in the 
venture capital cycle, from initial selection phase, through the investment process to the 
exit, we asked what they had learned and what advice they would give someone else in 
a similar situation. We also discussed what they would do differently if they were to raise 
venture capital again for a new venture. The interviews were structured to obtain insights 
and experiences from all phases of the venture capital cycle. After 10 to 12 interviews, we 
started to see evidence of saturation, with respondents giving very similar answers to our 
questions. On average, interviews lasted approximately one hour. Once completed, the 
interviews were transcribed and analyzed using Nvivo software. We began coding induc-
tively, using first-order codes based on concepts and themes expressed directly in the 
statements of the interviewees (Corbin and Strauss 2014; Van Maanen 1979). Codes and 
themes were reviewed and adjusted until agreement among researchers was achieved. 
Figure 1 shows the progression from the first-order coding to second-level themes (Gioia, 
Corley, and Hamilton 2013), which then produce our aggregate understanding of how 
entrepreneurs mitigate the information asymmetry problems in a VC–entrepreneur 
relationship.
4. Results
4.1. Choosing the time to raise the first external capital (Timing)
The first mechanism that emerged from our analysis was the timing for raising the initial 
external capital. Choosing the right time and considering the need behind raising external 
capital mitigates the risk of adverse selection by helping entrepreneurs distinguishing 
between venture capital and other financing sources. Our interviews suggested that 
founders need to understand advantages and disadvantages of using different funding 
sources at different points in time. Several of the interviewees stressed that founders 
should not raise venture capital too early unless they really have to. By bootstrapping and 
applying for public grants or loans, many startups can often decrease the need for 
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external capital in the very early phases. Venture capital is necessary if the competition is 
high and there is a need for speed to get to market. As one entrepreneur explained:
If new entrepreneurs asked me about advice on raising VC, I would ask them if they really 
needed the money right now and if there was any way they could lower their burn rate 
instead. In most cases you can wait longer than you think.
In research, the term “investment readiness” is used to explain whether founders are 
perceived to possess the attributes that make them an investible proposition by an 
investor. Our study suggests that this term is equally important from the entrepreneur’s 
perspective. The founder and the startup need to be investment-ready before they 
receive external funding. Many interviewees stated that founders need to be prepared 
for the new expectations that arise from the moment the first external capital is raised. As 
one entrepreneur said:
As soon as you raise external capital for the first time it is like you turn an hourglass. No matter 
how good and patient investors you have, the clock starts ticking. Not only in your investors’ 
mind but in the minds of other people and other investors.
Figure 1. Overview of data structure.
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Suddenly, there is a benchmark on how far the company needs to have gotten after 
a certain time, for example, in terms of level of revenue and conversion rate. 
Consequently, it is often good to raise capital when the startup already has gotten 
some traction or when a milestone has been reached.
My first and most important advice is to never be in a hurry to raise venture capital. If you start 
to raise VC the first thing you do, you will be in a very bad position to negotiate, which means 
that you will get bad terms and then you really need to work to get your investment and to 
prove that your idea works. If you wait and take it at a slower pace, get 1-2 paying customers, 
get some angels who invest, then when you approach the VC firms you will not need to work 
as hard, instead they will be interested to come to you since you have something that seems 
to work since you have paying customers. It is then about raising money to grow, not 
finishing the development of your product. That is really what venture capital should be for.
I believe that many startups could just take an extra year to do things right, and not rush into 
venture capital which many experts tell you to. VC has its place. But it works best when you 
have something that is up and running but you need to grow faster to not lose out on growth 
opportunities.
Some entrepreneurs even mentioned the possibility of raising capital when the startup is 
not in need of external capital. In this way, they have a better negotiating position against 
capital providers. Almost all interviewed founders had started with some form of external 
capital from business angels. Funding from VCs came in the second to fourth round. The 
entrepreneurs quite frequently mentioned that raising capital is a time-consuming pro-
cess. The founder needs to be aware that from the moment the first external capital is 
raised a lot of time and energy need to be devoted to reporting and working with 
requirements from current investors and recurring capital rounds.
It takes a lot more time to work with these things than you think. In the end we had one 
person working full time with these kinds of questions. Not the same person, but someone was 
always occupied with either reporting requirements or new prospects. So, it comes with a cost.
Another insight we found in regard to timing was the importance of having the founder 
team in place before the first external capital is raised. If the founder wants to have co- 
owners this should be settled before the VCs take their equity shares. As one entrepreneur 
explained:
Even if I really wanted the first key employees to become co-owners of the company, it was 
too late after I had raised the first external capital. No 27-year-old could afford to buy shares 
based on that valuation.
Connected to this, several entrepreneurs mentioned how important it is that there is 
alignment about vision among founders before raising and talking to VCs. It is important 
that co-founders know each other well and that they know how they work together. Table 
2 provides additional examples of how entrepreneurs use timing as a mechanism to 
mitigate information asymmetry risks.
4.2. Ensuring that the VC fits the startup (Matching)
The second mechanism that emerged from our analysis was the matching between VC 
and startup. By finding a VC that fits the startup well, the entrepreneur mitigates both the 
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risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. Few Swedish startups have the luxury of 
choosing the investor they want. However, in our interviews many startups had at least 
two investors to choose between at some point during their entrepreneurial journey. Our 
interviews suggested that founders should consider how the VC fits on a strategic as well 
as on a personal level. As one entrepreneur who had the option to choose between 
several investors mentioned:
We were naive in a lot of aspects, but when choosing investors, we were quite aware of the 
negative consequences that could arise if we got an investor who didn’t have the same view 
as we had on of how to build a company.
Many entrepreneurs stated how important the personal fit is and compared the VC– 
entrepreneur relationship to a marriage. The founders will be closely connected to the 
people investing in the company for a long time and if the right partner was not chosen, 
Table 2. Choosing the time to raise the initial external capital (Timing).
Reasons for raising the initial VC Investment readiness Time consuming process
The right timing for external capital 
depends on what type of capital 
you aim for. I’m currently in the 
board for another company and we 
talk a lot about this; either we go 
for well-known or extremely 
experienced BA or a VC who will 
increase the status of the company, 
or we take it slowly and start with 
governmental loans or funding 
before we search for more funding.
One negative aspect [from the 
funding] that we didn’t expect was 
the hype around us. Even though 
we were in an extremely early 
phase, business media wrote “Here 
is the tech investors’ new favorite.” 
That was good for our motivation 
and confidence, but it put a lot of 
pressure on us.
We had two different VCs with two 
different CFOs who each had their 
own templates who wanted 
monthly reports. Every month I had 
to provide them with income 
statement, balance sheet, financing 
plan. I had to update these and 
adapt them into two different 
formats. This took at least 2–3 
working days a month. Then we 
can add all the board meetings and 
other stuff on top of that.
Since we were quite unknown in the 
industry, we quickly realized that 
we needed to find a way to build 
creditability around us as founders 
and around the company we 
wanted to build.
It depends on your ambition and the 
risk you are willing to take. This 
needs to be discussed among 
founders before you discuss 
financing strategy.
One surprise was how much they [the 
VCs] required reporting wise and 
how little they actually knew about 
our business.
The only reason for raising VC at an 
early stage is when your 
competition is so high that you 
need to move quickly. In all other 
cases there are usually better 
alternatives than venture capital.
I would also recommend new 
entrepreneurs to be meticulous 
with board meeting protocols and 
other documentation. People will 
want to look at this. And do it in 
English.
These guys are high maintenance.
I think that if you can solve your 
financing through family and 
friends or savings before you have 
a working beta version, you stand 
much stronger and you don’t need 
to get diluted at an early stage.
We started to discuss with potential 
investors already when we still had 
our full time jobs. Then several of 
the potential investors expressed 
their concern about how much we 
really wanted to do this if we still 
had our full time jobs and did not 
risk anything.
When I now work as a private investor 
I always tell the founder: “Think 
about this before you say yes. Are 
you really sure that you want to 
have us in your company? We are 
extremely difficult to work with, we 
will be in touch almost 
every second day.“ So they don’t 
get disappointed and think that we 
are crazy when we call them in the 
evening or on Sundays. At least 
then we have been open about it.
We had to raise money to get 
a breathing hole. To be able to 
employ more developers and staff 
as well as to work on the customers 
that were on their way in.
It will really help if you have 
something to show. It could be 
a really lousy prototype, but to just 
be able to show something will 
make investors think “ah this 
actually works.”
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these years can be difficult. The importance of a good relationship with the responsible 
partner was often mentioned by the entrepreneurs. This person should understand the 
company and show excitement about the business idea. As one entrepreneur 
commented:
At first you might celebrate and be super happy that you managed to raise external capital, 
but if you haven’t ensured a good personal fit with the investors, your working climate might 
be everything but nice. After a couple of weeks you might think ‘OMG what did we get 
ourselves into’.
Even though the personal fit is important, the cultural and strategic fit were even more 
discussed among the entrepreneurs; particularly, how the risk versus return mindset 
needs to be aligned between investors and founders. As one entrepreneur explained:
Our VC’s investment philosophy was all or nothing, just like us founders. Our startup was an 
experiment and we all agreed that we should see if the experiment worked as quickly as 
possible.
Another area that needs to be aligned between the VC and founders is how, where and 
how fast the startup should expand. If founders consider growing slowly on the 
Scandinavian market, they should not seek capital from investors who are focusing on 
rapid global expansion for their portfolio companies. Furthermore, several interviewees 
mentioned that it is important to understand during which phase the VC usually invests in 
their ventures. If the VCs are used to invest in later stages, they may not be able to support 
a startup in a very early phase in the right way, and vice versa.
Every startup has its phases and you need to work differently in each phase. We didn’t know 
that our first VC usually invested in larger startups compared to us. We were in need of 
getting processes and structure in place but since they usually invested in companies that 
already had that, they instead told us to focus exclusively on growth. In hindsight, this was 
not a good advice during this phase.
As mentioned in the findings about the “timing” mechanism, it is preferable if the startup 
already has traction or has reached a milestone when raising external capital, but this in 
not feasible for many companies. For example, deep technology startups or medtech 
startups have a much longer time to market and heavy investments need to be done 
during the initial years. Hence, the investor match for these kinds of companies is different 
from companies that are easily scalable in an early phase. The classical VC with an 
investment horizon of three to seven years before exit is therefore not a suitable fit. 
Instead, these companies often turn to business angel syndicates, evergreen funds, or 
governmental VCs to find investors that consider the long-term investment commitment. 
Only at a later stage is venture capital funding a viable option for these companies. One 
founder of a deeptech startup explained:
One of our investors was a VC based on a fund with limited partners. They were really good, 
but their money had a time limit. When they understood that they would not be able to 
collect their returns before the closure of the fund, they left the company.
Although the strategic fit is important, it can be difficult to receive the necessary 
information about the VCs to be able to assess if there is a potential fit or not. One option 
is to ask the VC directly. As one serial entrepreneur commented:
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In most dating situations it would be absurd to ask about the intention of the possible 
relationship the first time you meet. But during an investment meeting you can take the 
opportunity to ask the VCs about their work “If you invest in us, how do you work? How long 
will you sit?” and so on.
However, most interviewees suggested gathering information about the VC from earlier 
or existing portfolio firms instead. Our findings suggest that this information is quite easily 
accessible since most entrepreneurs in our study seem to be willing to help one another 
with these types of questions. As another serial entrepreneur explained:
For my second startup I contacted the CEOs of the investors’ current portfolio firms. I asked 
them how things had worked between them and the investor, what worked well and what 
worked less well. Then I received very valuable information. Like a job interview, you check 
the references.
Our interviews suggested that entrepreneurs need to do a due diligence to understand 
how they match with the potential VC and if the VC is going to add value in addition to 
capital. Finally, it should be noted that “matching” is not necessarily a question of choice 
in this relationship. Even when the entrepreneur has only one possible VC willing to 
invest, it is still important for them to investigate this single investor, so as to have 
reasonable expectations. Table 3 highlights the importance of both a personal and 
company fit.
4.3. Studying and understanding the venture capital process beforehand 
(Preparation)
The third mechanism related to mitigating the information asymmetry problems that 
emerged from our analysis was the knowledge gathering about the venture capital 
process beforehand. Our interviewees described how the access to information has 
improved notably during the last 10 years. All entrepreneurs understood that they had 
to do research about how venture capital functions before raising external capital. For 
some of the interviewed entrepreneurs the reading up on capital markets and venture 
capital came as a fun and interesting exercise, whereas others struggled and had little 
interest in these kinds of questions:
I was extremely uninterested of the capital market and venture capital. I only wanted to build 
a good company. This probably caused a poor understanding of the mechanisms behind VC 
funding and what investors were expecting of me.
The entrepreneurs quite frequently stated the need for understanding how a VC is 
formally set up with a fund, limited partners, and fund managers, but also the phases of 
the VC fund from raising the fund to closing the fund.
I think you need to meet a couple of investors and understand how their business model 
works. The model of VC investors is based on investments in a portfolio of firms. Most of these 
firms, 90%, will not work. That perspective is extremely important for an entrepreneur to 
have.
Although interviews suggested that it was important to understand how a VC formally 
works, the importance of understanding how the VC works informally was equally 
discussed. As one entrepreneur elaborated:
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You need to understand the hierarchy of a fund; partner, principal, associate. If an associate 
who has been six weeks with the VC shows interest in your company, it doesn’t mean 
anything. You have one piglet who likes you, but it is the sow that is in charge.
In addition to understanding how the VC is set up it was also discussed how to receive 
knowledge about the actual investment process of the VCs. The main areas that were 
mentioned among the interviewees as important to read up on were the VCs’ investment 
cycle (from deal screening to exit), technicalities behind the financial instruments used (e.g., 
preference shares, new issues of shares, convertible loan), and the logic behind startup 
valuations. There was also a need of understanding how future capital rounds work:
I think it is quite good to read up on the different funding rounds; seed funding, early stage 
funding, series A, B and C funding rounds, to understand how they work. It is of course not the 
same amounts as in US but trying to convert it into a Swedish context is a useful exercise.
Even though much information can be found from books, web searches, and podcasts, 
many entrepreneurs emphasized the importance of having a mentor, advisory board or 
other types of experienced people to guide them through the process. Receiving advice 
directly from other entrepreneurs who had raised external capital themselves was often 
mentioned as important help along the way:
We were lucky to quite early meet xxx who has built and sold his own company and who is 
now an angel investor. He very generously shared information and his own experiences from 
fund raising, which helped us a lot.
Table 3. Finding a VC that fits the startup (Matching).
Personal fit Company fit
I would say that all business is about people. Who do you 
have on the other side? Do we have the same values? 
Do we want the same thing for the company? You are 
often not that many owners, so to create a nice and 
constructive working climate you need to know what 
everyone wants with the company.
Choose a VC that fit your company like a glove. Where the 
VC likes what you do and where the partner 
understands and cares about what you do.
If I would decide to go for VC financing again, I would 
probably spend more time with the people before. If 
the personal chemistry doesn’t work, I would probably, 
if I could afford, back out. When we met our investors, it 
was always 100% business. I didn’t know who they 
were as people before they invested.
The first time I raised external capital I didn’t do my 
homework, I didn’t to a DD on the investors and ended 
up in a situation where we had very different views on 
how to run a business and how to handle teams and 
employees. They had a very short investment horizon. 
They wanted us to make an IPO after two years and 
raise a lot of capital. While we thought that we weren’t 
ready. But they said: “We are majority owners and you 
have to execute on this.” So, it is extremely important to 
know who you go to bed with.
Raising VC is like a wedding. You will be together for 
10 years, so you need to be picky of whom you choose.
An important thing which I think is often missed in the 
initial discussions with investors is if you have common 
view on how you should grow the company. How fast 
should you grow? Which markets?
I think that value alignment is really important when you 
deal with investor. That you have the same values. 
I don’t care much for investors who say that “we have 
50 people who can help you within different questions 
in different areas.” I’m not interested in that. I think that 
the people on the board should be really smart and 
sharp. And be involved and care about the company. 
Not arriving at a meeting every third month and say 
“Ok, can you let us know what happened since we last 
met?”
I would say that you need investors who have a similar 
culture to you, where you understand each other. And 
that you can work on honest and equal terms. If you 
don’t have fun at work when you work in these kinds of 
companies, you won’t cope since it’s so much hard 
work. Since a lot of energy went to questions and 
conflicts among owners or bureaucracy issues, it took 
away my joy to work.
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Table 4 offers additional support for how collecting information about the VC process 
beforehand mitigates the information asymmetry risks.
4.4. Building an open and honest relationship (Trust-building)
The final mechanism that emerged from our analysis was the trust between VCs and 
founders. By building an open and trusting relationship, the entrepreneurs mitigate the 
risk of moral hazard from the VCs. The “hidden actions” in this context refer to VCs acting 
opportunistically and not in the best interest of the founders and their startup. In our 
study we found several areas where the VC may act opportunistically and pursue their 
own self-interest. One example is when the VC pressures the entrepreneur to take 
excessive risk as the VC is diversified among a number of portfolio companies whereas 
entrepreneurs typically have their financial returns dependent upon the success of 
a single venture. Another example of opportunistic behavior and moral hazard is when 
the VC overpromises on value adding activities and insufficiently invests these non- 
financial resources into the firm due to time constraints or loss of interest in the particular 
startup. As one entrepreneur explained:
The difficult thing with venture capital is that the VC usually has ten different portfolio 
companies. One of these might become a super success, two might return some money 
and the rest of their ventures will probably fail. So, the VC has the incentive to risk a lot to get 
one company to become a super star.
Table 4. Collecting information about the VC process beforehand (Preparation).
Gathering of information on the VC 
process beforehand Understanding how VCs work Understanding the VC process
Today there are at least ten podcasts 
that discuss the VC process. One 
good podcast is called “xxx.” It 
describes a startup’s journey from 
start to exit.
It is important to understand how 
venture capital works. You need to 
think about that the partner’s time 
is the bottleneck. They only have 
time to sit in x amount of boards. 
That’s why it sometimes can be 
more difficult to raise smaller 
amount.
That is their [the VCs] business model, 
to buy cheap and sell expensive. 
The reason to why they wanted to 
exit was probably because they felt 
that the company had stagnated 
and that they couldn’t see any 
future value increase. So they 
thought that they might as well sell 
it.
My first advice is to choose a VC with 
experience from the industry. 
My second advice is that you do 
a proper DD on potential investors.
Different funds like different kind or 
risk, for example technical risk, 
marketing risk, founder risk. It is 
therefore meaningless to discuss 
with certain funds.
You need to learn the technicalities 
behind the financial instruments 
used. Preference shares, 
convertible loan and so on.
Take advice from someone who 
started and ran their own business 
before. And who has had 
experience from raising external 
capital.
I don’t think I understood their [the 
VC’s] intentions. What kind of 
return did they need? What kind of 
structure were they after? That 
made it difficult for me.
Understand valuations.
My dad has worked with financing 
before, so I have been able to ask 
him some things. Sometimes he 
has been able to help and 
sometimes not at all. But it has 
been nice to have him as 
a sounding board. But a lot I had to 
learn by myself.
Don’t just look at the valuations. Read 
the book “xxxxx.”
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Our findings suggest that interviewees use trust-building and honest and open commu-
nication to build a smooth relationship and avoid future conflicts. As discussed in the 
“matching” section, it is important to match the phase of the startup with the VC’s 
strategy and earlier experience. If the founder is honest and clear about their current 
phase this will benefit the relationship with the investor.
It is important to be clear about which phase your startup is in and to match this with the VC. 
If the VC thinks that you have gotten further, they might not accept that the company 
suddenly pivots and does something completely different which I think is quite usual in the 
very early phases.
One big advantage of venture capital is that the founders receive a sounding board to 
turn to in difficult times. Entrepreneurs and their startups exist in a complex and 
turbulent environment. When things do not go according to plan it is important that 
founders and investors can work and solve problems together. Important decisions 
often need to be taken quickly and with scant data, leaving little time to evaluate the 
other party’s motive or hidden agenda. Consequently, it is important to build trust at 
an early stage and then maintain it by continuously working on building the 
relationship.
Ensure that you have investors who are similar to you culture-wise, that you understand each 
other, and that you can cooperate on honest and fair terms. If you don’t have fun at work 
when you work in these kinds of companies you will not cope since it is so much hard work. If 
you need to put a lot of energy into questions and conflicts regarding ownership it will take 
away the joy to work with this. That was what happened to me.
Since open and honest behavior from the entrepreneur will never control the VC in any 
formal way, as a contract does, it is questionable whether these mechanisms actually 
mitigates the risk of moral hazard or, instead, function as signaling mechanisms. Our 
findings suggests that there might be a difference between experienced and less experi-
enced entrepreneurs. Based on our interviews, experienced entrepreneurs are more likely 
to use these mechanisms to manage moral hazard risks since at least they understand the 
importance of mutual trust or clearer contract terms, which indirectly might lead to fewer 
opportunities for the VC to act opportunistically. Table 5 provides additional examples of 
how experienced entrepreneurs use trust and open communication as a mechanism to 
mitigate information asymmetry risks.
5. Discussion
5.1. Entrepreneurial mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry problems
The aim of this study was to investigate how entrepreneurs mitigate information asym-
metry problems in a VC–entrepreneur relationship. Although certain scholars have 
acknowledged that problems arising from asymmetric information are two-sided 
(Carpentier and Suret 2006; Christensen, Wuebker, and Wüstenhagen 2009; De 
Bettignies and Brander 2007; Fairchild 2011; Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001), research 
has not examined how these problems are mitigated from the entrepreneur’s perspective. 
This study contributes to the research on two-sided information asymmetry by identifying 
empirically how these problems are managed by entrepreneurs.
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Table 6 provides an overview of information asymmetry problems in a VC–entrepre-
neur relationship. The two columns to the right show different mechanisms used by VCs 
and entrepreneurs for mitigating the different information asymmetry risks. The VCs’ 
mechanisms (e.g., screening, contracting, monitoring) have been studied by numerous 
scholars, whereas the entrepreneurs’ mechanisms (apart from signaling) have been over-
looked in current literature. Table 6 shows that the risk of adverse selection for the 
entrepreneur can be mitigated by matching, timing, and preparing. The risk of moral 
hazard for the entrepreneur can be mitigated by building trust and ensuring matching.
By considering both personal and strategic fit with the investors (matching), the 
entrepreneurs have to do due diligence on the investors and thereby decrease the risk 
of a bad match (adverse selection). By considering the timing and the reasons for raising 
the initial external capital, founders can better distinguish between venture capital and 
other financing sources (adverse selection). By collecting information about the venture 
capital process beforehand (preparing), the founders not only enhance their position to 
negotiate but also gather more knowledge on what to expect from a “good match” or 
a “good investor” (adverse selection). By building an open and trusting relationship and 
finding a good match with the investor, the entrepreneur increases the chances that their 
Table 5. Building an open and trusting relationship (Trust-building).
Being honest from the beginning Having a good communication
It is very similar to a wedding I would say. If you start 
a relationship and things don’t turn out the way you 
thought, it very easily ends in a bad divorce. Especially if 
you haven’t been honest with each other from the start.
I don’t have any problems with partners who disagree and 
argue, but what happened to us what that they didn’t 
understand at all what we were doing. They could 
come to meeting and say things that weren’t relevant 
for us at all.
We founders talked a lot about that it is not enough to 
have investors with good knowledge and strategic 
value; it has to be people in whom we trust and with 
who we could talk to if something went really bad.
Investors want to market and sell themselves as well, and 
some things they say might be . . ..overrated. I think that 
many startups tend to forget this . . . But this power 
balances can change quite quickly when the papers are 
signed. The terms might be quite advantageous for the 
investors and they can come and say “Now when we 
have had some time to think, our expectation is that 
you need to have a working business model in a year 
from now.” I think that discussions like these might 
come as a shock to many founders.
Table 6. Mechanisms used by VCs and entrepreneurs to mitigate information asymmetry risks.
Information asymmetry risks Mechanisms used by VCs
Mechanisms 
used by 
entrepreneurs
Adverse Selection VC To distinguish between good and 
bad ventures
- Screening/Due diligence 
- Specialization 
- Syndication
- Signaling
Entrepreneurs To distinguish between different 
funding alternatives and 
investors
- Matching 
- Timing 
- Preparing
Moral Hazard VC The risk of opportunistic behavior 
from the entrepreneur
- Staging of investments 
- Contracting 
- Monitoring 
- Trust-building
Entrepreneurs The risk of opportunistic behavior 
from the VC
- Trust-building 
- Matching
16 S. GLÜCKSMAN
interests and goals are aligned and decreases the risk of opportunistic behavior from the 
VC (moral hazard). The blank boxes in rows two and four show that we have not studied 
what VCs do to help entrepreneurs mitigate these problems, the same way as entrepre-
neurs use signaling to help VCs reduce theirs. Future studies should examine how VCs can 
support entrepreneurs in reducing their information asymmetry problems, perhaps by 
interviewing VCs with experiences of being entrepreneurs themselves.
This study investigated how entrepreneurs handle information asymmetry problems 
throughout the whole venture capital lifecycle. However, our findings suggest that most 
entrepreneurs use most of these tools in the pre-investment phase. Since adverse selec-
tion problems mainly arise pre-investment, entrepreneurs naturally need to use these 
tools before the investment, but for moral hazard problems that occur after the invest-
ment has been made, “building an open and trusting relationship” is the only tool used in 
the post-investment. This is an important finding: once the contract is signed, there seem 
to be few tools that can help entrepreneurs avoid problems that might arise from moral 
hazard.
5.2. Contribution to theory
The four themes described above are well-known by many experienced entrepreneurs, 
who sometimes share their anecdotal experiences through podcasts, blogs, books or 
mentorship programs. However, our goal in this study was to try to convert anecdotal 
evidence from entrepreneurs to more general knowledge and also to apply a theoretical 
perspective to the anecdotes. When reviewing studies of the entrepreneurial perspective 
on venture capital, we found few empirical findings concerning the information/knowl-
edge gap between entrepreneurs and investors. Filling this gap is our main academic 
contribution.
Even though information asymmetry has been used before to explain the relationship 
between VCs and entrepreneurs (e.g., Amit et al. 1998; Carpentier and Suret 2006; De 
Bettignies and Brander 2007), this study provides three main contributions to the litera-
ture that further develop this field. The first contribution is in underlining how a two-sided 
agency perspective on a VC–entrepreneur relationship helps identifying mechanisms that 
mitigate information asymmetry risks. In most venture capital research, the VC is seen as 
the principal and the entrepreneur as the agent (cf. Arthurs and Busenitz 2003; Drover, 
Wood, and Fassin 2014). Since VCs have substantial power over firm activities and 
ultimately the exit strategy, we swapped the roles in this study and considered VCs as 
agents and entrepreneurs as principals. By reversing the roles, we were able to study the 
VC–entrepreneur relationship from another perspective. In so doing, we treated the 
entrepreneur as a more active part in the entrepreneur–VC relationship, reflecting what 
we view as an important part of reality. Most VC research views the investor as the leading 
party in the investment process and portrays the entrepreneur as a passive target. By 
contrast, this study suggests that entrepreneurs play a much more active role than is 
suggested by extant literature.
As raising venture capital is not a recurring event for novice entrepreneurs, they 
typically lack access to formal mechanisms similar to what VC firms have in place to 
mitigate risks. Instead, entrepreneurs need to develop their own mechanisms and infor-
mal tools along the way by relying on advice from entrepreneurs with prior venture 
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capital experience. Several of the interviewees explained how they built knowledge 
through reading books and listening to podcasts. Many entrepreneurs especially empha-
sized the importance of having a mentor, advisory board or other types of experienced 
people to guide them through the process. Thus, building knowledge from other people’s 
experiences therefore seems to have an important role in the learning process for 
entrepreneurs raising venture capital. We encourage scholars to further explore beyond 
the one-sided agency perspective of the VC–entrepreneur relationship.
The second contribution made by this study refers to uncovering mechanisms that 
entrepreneurs actively use to improve their relationship with a VC and reduce potential 
risks. As information asymmetry is recognized as a major problem (Amit et al. 1998; 
Landström 2017) as well as a prerequisite in the VC–entrepreneur relationship (without 
information asymmetry there would be no need for VCs), we explored the entrepreneurial 
experiences from the lens of information asymmetry theory. VCs are professional deal-
makers and consequently have an information advantage over entrepreneurs in search of 
external funding. VCs are able to draft better contracts, benefit more from the relation-
ship, or at least ensure that their risks are better hedged than those of the entrepreneurs. 
The better the entrepreneur is prepared for the negotiations and the better their under-
standing of VCs’ investment process, motives, and other relevant issues is, the more likely 
it is that entrepreneurs will negotiate themselves suitable deals and maximize the 
relationship with their investors.
One relevant question when discussing information asymmetry from the entrepre-
neur’s perspective is whether the VC is withholding information or simply has greater 
expertise, leaving the entrepreneur at a knowledge disadvantage. Based on this study’s 
findings, both conditions are usually found in a VC-entrepreneur relationship. For very 
new and inexperienced entrepreneurs, there is indisputably a knowledge disadvantage 
and a need to learn and gather knowledge about the process. In this case it is not 
necessarily information asymmetry theory that might explain the behavior. However, as 
novice entrepreneurs gain experience of the funding process, their knowledge disadvan-
tage diminishes. Hence, for more experienced entrepreneurs who know what to expect 
from the process, the VC’s intended post-investment actions might indeed have been 
hidden from the entrepreneurs in the early discussions. Thus, information asymmetry 
theory most probably fits better when explaining less novice entrepreneurs’ behavior 
towards VCs.
Relatedly, it is also important to distinguish between “managing VCs’ asymmetric 
information advantage” and “mitigating problems from information asymmetry in 
a VC–entrepreneur relationship”. The former refers to how entrepreneurs are at 
a knowledge disadvantage since they are novices while the VCs are experts, and that 
information is available to the entrepreneur through homework and due diligence. The 
latter refers to how entrepreneurs use the remaining mechanisms in order to reduce the 
risks of opportunistic behavior by the VC or negative experiences in the VC-entrepreneur 
relationship.
By focusing on the entrepreneur’s perspective, we are following a research stream 
that acknowledges the entrepreneurs’ influential role in fundraising (Bengtsson and 
Wang 2010; Drover, Wood, and Fassin 2014; Fairchild 2011; Hallen and Eisenhardt 
2012; Hsu 2004; Valliere and Peterson 2007). In contrast to Valliere and Peterson 
(2007), we argue that entrepreneurs with experience do not have valuation and deal 
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terms as the primary criteria when choosing VCs. In fact, out of our 20 interviewees, 
only one entrepreneur discussed how to receive higher valuations. Instead, several of 
the entrepreneurs discussed that one should not be blinded by high valuations but 
rather consider the type of money and the personal and strategic fit with the 
investor to increase the chances of a good relationship throughout the whole VC 
journey. This is partly in line with findings of Hsu (2004), who suggests that entre-
preneurs are willing to forego offers with higher valuations to partner with more 
reputable VCs. Rather than focusing solely on reputation, this study suggests that 
there are other areas which can cause the entrepreneur to accept decreased valua-
tions. Furthermore, this study agrees with Valliere and Peterson (2007) that entre-
preneurs have little focus on “smart money” and value added services; however it 
also suggests that entrepreneurs find it important to have a VC who understands the 
business and industry.
In accordance with De Bettignies and Brander (2007) and Christensen, Wuebker, and 
Wüstenhagen (2009), this study confirms that the risk of moral hazard is present from the 
entrepreneur’s perspective. We contribute to these works by discussing how entrepre-
neurs handle this risk. Since most entrepreneurs do not have the option to negotiate in 
their contracts and cannot use this formal way of mitigating moral hazard issues, our 
study suggests that entrepreneurs mitigate this risk by building trust and ensuring 
a match. The fact that VCs have invested in several startups before usually gives the 
investors an information advantage, but in terms of moral hazard it can give the entre-
preneurs an advantage since they are able to investigate the VC’s earlier moral hazard 
behavior with prior portfolio firms. We encourage scholars to further explore how infor-
mation asymmetry influences the VC–entrepreneur relationship, perhaps by interviewing 
both entrepreneurs and VCs from the same dyad.
The third contribution of our study is that it provides a new perspective on 
matching and trust between VCs and founders. Only a handful of researchers 
have studied the two-sided need of both matching and trust in a VC–entrepre-
neur relationship in relation to information asymmetry and agency problems 
(e.g., Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001). Our study stresses the importance of 
these factors in mitigating information asymmetry problems from the entrepre-
neur’s perspective throughout the full process. In accordance with De Clercq 
et al. (2006), this study confirms the need of finding the right investor and 
ensuring a good match between the investor and entrepreneur. Whereas De 
Clercq and colleagues focus on the importance of complementary skills, our 
findings suggest that the entrepreneurs consider personal compatibility with 
the VC, similar view on expansion, and how to build a company as more 
important areas. To succeed with a good match, entrepreneurs have to under-
stand what they need in terms of personal and strategic fit, but they also need 
knowledge about what is offered out there.
5.3. Contribution to practice
This study provides an important practical contribution to entrepreneurs and to practitioners 
aiming to support nascent entrepreneurs by gathering valuable advice on issues concerning 
venture capital funding. By reading about the experiences from the entrepreneurs in this 
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study, nascent entrepreneurs can find helpful advice on how to manage and maximize their 
relationship with a VC. Even though much of entrepreneurial learning is said to be experiential 
in nature, reading about potential risks can help nascent entrepreneurs avoid the most 
obvious bumps. Several of the entrepreneurs in this study had been in incubator or accelerator 
programs. Almost all of these founders mentioned how venture capital was discussed as “the 
only option” for funding while there was little or no focus on alternative financing sources in 
the programs. Most coaching regarding financing concentrated around pitch training to VC 
investors and rarely discussed potential problems that may arise in this relationship with a VC 
firm or what founders should consider before raising venture capital. Therefore, this study can 
provide a more nuanced picture of venture capital funding, especially to entrepreneurs in 
incubators or accelerators.
Furthermore, this study acts as a counterweight to popular media and their reporting on 
venture capital. Instead of only reading about success stories and the actual moment of 
fundraising, entrepreneurs can receive a more unbiased view on the full VC–entrepreneur 
relationship. In Appendix B we provide a short list of what nascent entrepreneurs might 
consider before raising venture capital for the first time based on the experiences of the 
Swedish entrepreneurs who participated in this study.
6. Limitations
This study mainly focuses on institutional venture capital, which refers to VCs 
with a fund structure with limited partners. However, almost all interviewees 
had also been funded by other types of venture capital such as business angels, 
family offices, governmental venture capital, and corporate venture capital. An 
important finding in this study is that entrepreneurs need to understand advan-
tages and disadvantages of different financing alternatives to reduce the risk of 
adverse selection. Choosing between venture capital and other financing alter-
natives is one aspect. The other aspect is choosing between various types of 
venture capital. Since entrepreneurs’ motives for attracting venture capital 
differ, different types of investors can play different and complementary roles 
in their venture. This study has only scratched the surface of this last aspect and 
future studies could benefit from examining the entrepreneurs’ experiences 
from different types of venture capital.
As is the case in all interview-based methodologies, there is a risk of sample bias. With 
regard to our sample, we acknowledge that a number of factors, particularly region, could 
influence their answers. We only interviewed Swedish entrepreneurs who have raised 
venture capital from Swedish and foreign VCs. Thus, we encourage similar studies in other 
regions. With regard to the risk of adverse selection, the terms “good or bad investor” are 
central terms. For a VC it is more transparent what a “good” or “bad” venture might entail, 
but from an entrepreneur’s perspective, these terms are subject to more personal biases. 
Future research could benefit from further examining the matching between an entre-
preneur and a VC and the terms “good” or “bad” investors from an entrepreneur’s 
perspective.
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Appendix A. List of interview questions
Briefly provide a history of yourself and your startup
Can you walk me through the various financing stages of your company?
Pre-Investment phase
Why did you decide to raise external capital? Why venture capital?
Why did you choose this VC?
How and when did you make the first contact?
Did you raise external capital from other investors? From whom?
What was most difficult during the pre-investment phase?
What did you learn from this phase?
What did you know about this phase before?
If you were to give any advice on this phase to new entrepreneurs who are thinking about raising 
external capital, what would that be?
Post-Investment phase
Beside capital, what did the VCs contribute with after the initial investment?
What was most difficult during the post-investment phase?
What did you know about this phase before?
If you were to give any advice on this phase to new entrepreneurs who are thinking about raising 
external capital, what would that be?
Exit phase (if applicable)
Why did you do this type of exit?
When was the exit strategy decided?
What was most difficult during the exit phase?
What did you learn from this phase?
What did you know about this phase before?
If you were to give any advice on this phase to new entrepreneurs who are thinking about raising 
external capital, what would that be?
Insights
Was this your first startup?
If yes
Have you raised venture capital before? Why again?
Have you raised capital from the same VC as the first time?
Financing wise, what did you do different in your subsequent startup/s compared to your first 
startup?
If no
If you started a new company would you raise venture capital again?
If yes, would you raise with the same VC? If yes, why? If no, why not?
What would you do differently if you would raise venture capital for a new startup?
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What are the most important insights from your VC journey/s?
What were the biggest surprises during your VC journey/s?
Which general advice would you give someone who is planning to raise external capital for the 
first time?
Appendix B. 10 things to consider before you raise venture capital for the 
first time
- Ensure that your reasons behind raising external capital are in line with venture capital functioning.
- Consider whether bootstrapping, family/friends or public grants/funding might be sufficient in 
the early stages.
- Be aware of the new expectations that will arise on both founders and startup once the first 
venture capital is raised.
- Have your founder team in place. It will be difficult to add new co-founders once the first round 
has been done.
- Be aware that raising venture capital and dealing with the VCs’ requirements is a time and 
energy consuming process.
- Ensure that personalities fit between founders and investors. Ensure similar view on expansion 
plans and on risk and return mindset.
- Make your due diligence on the VC. Discuss with earlier portfolio firms.
- Gather information about the VC process beforehand (books, podcast, mentors).
- Understand how a VC works, both formally (what is their set up and how do they make money) 
and informally (who decides).
- Build an open and trusting relationship with the VC to align interests and goals.
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